Kherson Withdrawal: Pros & Cons

Pragmatic necessity or tragic mistake?

The decision reached and announced by overall theatre commander General “Armageddon” Surovikin and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu to withdraw Russian forces across the Dnepr River, abandoning Kherson City to Kiev regime forces, despite the fact that the Russian defense lines in the area had so far thrown back every Kiev regime assault with heavy casualties - is undoubtedly a controversial one, and resulted in a tidal wave of the gnashing of teeth, pulling of hair, beating of chest, doom & glooming, and accusation of “betrayal” by Russian and pro-Russian media & commentators, both and expert and armchair.

As well as raucous jubilation and celebration of this “great victory” by their Western and Kiev Putsch regime equivalents.

It was undoubtedly a tough decision, long planned, and well-executed, which with hindsight we can now see that Surovikin was directly referring to in his first press conference upon becoming overall commander of the “SMO” in Ukraine on October 18th, when he described the situation at the southern front as ‘tense’ and that, “We will not exclude taking the most difficult decisions.”

So, let’s take a look at some of the pros and cons being argued about the decision from the Russian military perspective:
Pros -

1. Supply and Logistics Concerns – No longer having to rely on pontoons and bridges that are being targeted by artillery and rockets every other day to supply what was a 20-30k defensive force around Kherson City

2. The manpower needed to defend the Dnieper river will be much less than needed to defend Kherson

3. Thus freeing up manpower and other free up assets for the slow, grinding offensive in the Donbass. Or as US Army Colonel Douglas McGregor has argued in a recent interview about Russia freeing them up for what he claims is a planned massive winter offensive elsewhere meant to end the war in one fell swoop.

4. Securing Russian forces’ flank with the Dneper river, bridges across it now blown in the retreat, -a significant geographic barrier.

5. Narrowing the frontlines even further, which favors the side with less manpower (still Russia at least until the reservists are all fully retrained, equipped and arrive in theatre) and more artillery

6. Prevents the destruction of Kherson city and lives lost of the approximately 100k civilians, half the population that didn’t want to or couldn’t be evacuated,  that would have been incurred in a tough urban defense of the city

7. The much-discussed threat of the Kiev regime succeeding in their repeated attempts to destroy the Kakhovka Reservoir Dam, flooding much of the city and whole area, leading to massive civilian casualties and Russian troops on the right bank of the Dnepr being completely cut off and isolated from the rest of the forces and resupply for days,
And ending the water supply to Crimea through the Crimean Canal

8. Russian Force preservation - and prolongs the current stalemate situation until the Russian mobilized reservists arrive n theatre

Cons -

1. The Massive political damage and humiliation of losing the capitol city of one of the just recognized new regions of Russia. Kiev regime troops are already mockingly tearing down billboards around the city with the slogan “Russia – here forever”

2. Kiev regime force preservation – they would have taken very heavy casualties in trying to take the city

3. The Kiev regime now also free up manpower and assets which will be used in the Donbas or in Zaporozhe. They WILL be used somewhere else.

4. Kiev regime forces also now have a secured flank on the Dnepr

5. The loss of the strategic bridgehead across the Dneiper that won’t be easy to get back, ruling out any Russian move on Nikolayev and Odessa for the foreseeable future

6. Potential of increased support from the West in aid and equipment as the Kiev regime is seen as “winning” or at least “not a lost cause” to throw more money and weapons at

7. Ranged systems like HIMARS can now potentially reach targets in northern Crimea, including fire control of roads and supply lines in and out of the peninsula

8. Potential threat of domestic political unrest in Russia

9. The international reputation and perspective of Russia may take a hit.
 Russia’s allies and those still refusing to participate in Western  sanctions may see Russia as “losing” and a “lost cause”

10. Kiev regime atrocities and the subsequent war crimes propaganda blaming it on Russia, on the remaining civilians in Kherson City. The now usual chilling Kiev regime announcements about “cleansing” and mass text messages have already gone out asking people to report “collaborators” many of which will undoubtedly face torture and summary executions, as in Bucha and the Kharkov region. People Russia had sworn to protect as their own.

11. Morale boost to Kiev regime forces and morale loss among Russian troops

So - now you do the weighing summing math and come to your own armchair conclusion about whether the decision to withdraw from Kherson was a tragic but necessary call or a terrible mistake for the Russian military.