During the worst days of the Cold War era, both sides would realize the peril and would find a way to back away from the abyss. Our modern day laptop warriors seem to have lost that fear, finding it a bit cowardly.
The formerly classified "Essentials of Post-Cold War Deterrence" by STRATCOM in 1995 suggested the very opposite of sanity.
US-officials, the document said, should project a crazy, unpredictable persona. That, the draft concluded, would be in the interest of the state holding the power, unsuprisingly.
We must be ambiguous about details of our response (or preemption) if what we value is threatened, but it must be clear that our actions would have terrible consquences
(...)
While it is crucial to explicitly define and communicate
the acts or damage that we would find
unacceptable, we should not be too specific about
our responses. Because of the value that comes from
the ambiguity of what the US may do to an adversary
if the acts we seek to deter are carried out, it
hurts to portray ourselves as too fully rational and
cool-headed. The fact that some elements may appear
to be potentially out `of control´ can be beneficial
to creating and reinforcing fears and doubts
within the minds of an adversary´s decision makers.
This essential sense of fear is the working force of
deterrence. That the US may become irrational and
vindictive if its vital interests are attacked should be
a part of the national persona we project to all adversaries. (...)"
It would be interesting to see how such official record made public again would be talked away by US legacy media in the light of their usual Putin talking points.
During the worst days of the Cold War era, both sides would realize the peril and would find a way to back away from the abyss. Our modern day laptop warriors seem to have lost that fear, finding it a bit cowardly.
Speaking of an WMD-power acting "sane":
The formerly classified "Essentials of Post-Cold War Deterrence" by STRATCOM in 1995 suggested the very opposite of sanity.
US-officials, the document said, should project a crazy, unpredictable persona. That, the draft concluded, would be in the interest of the state holding the power, unsuprisingly.
See the original quote below:
https://www.nukestrat.com/us/stratcom/SAGessentials.PDF
obtained under FOIA by Hans Kristensen:
"(...)
We must be ambiguous about details of our response (or preemption) if what we value is threatened, but it must be clear that our actions would have terrible consquences
(...)
While it is crucial to explicitly define and communicate
the acts or damage that we would find
unacceptable, we should not be too specific about
our responses. Because of the value that comes from
the ambiguity of what the US may do to an adversary
if the acts we seek to deter are carried out, it
hurts to portray ourselves as too fully rational and
cool-headed. The fact that some elements may appear
to be potentially out `of control´ can be beneficial
to creating and reinforcing fears and doubts
within the minds of an adversary´s decision makers.
This essential sense of fear is the working force of
deterrence. That the US may become irrational and
vindictive if its vital interests are attacked should be
a part of the national persona we project to all adversaries. (...)"
It would be interesting to see how such official record made public again would be talked away by US legacy media in the light of their usual Putin talking points.